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This  paper  analyzes  the  effects  of  government  debt  and  income 
taxes on consumption  and saving in a world of infinitely lived house- 
holds  having  uncertain  and  heterogeneous  incomes.  The  special 
structure  of  the  model  allows exact  aggregation  across households 
despite  incomplete  markets.  The  effects  of  government  debt  are 
shown to be substantial, roughly  comparable  to those resulting  from 
finite horizons,  and crucially dependent  on  the length  of time until 
the debt  is repaid.  Also,  anticipated  changes  in taxes are shown  to 
cause anticipated  changes  in consumption.  Finally, an index of fiscal 
stance  is derived. 
I.  Introduction 
Economists  are  increasingly  aware  of  the  importance  of  heterogeneity 
among  individuals  for  issues  in macroeconomics.  One  such  issue  is the 
interaction  between  individual  income  uncertainty  and  tax  policy. 
Since  an individual's  personal  tax liability  is typically  contingent  on  his 
or  her  income  and  since  future  income  is  uncertain,  future  taxes 
provide  a  form  of  insurance.  This  insurance  effect  of  income  taxes 
has  normative  implications  regarding  the  desirability  of  the  taxes  (Va- 
rian  1980)  and  positive  implications  regarding  their  impact  on  con- 
We are grateful  to Jose  Scheinkman,  Jon  Skinner,  David Weil, and the referee  for 
helpful  comments. 
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sumption  and  saving  (Chan  1983;  Barsky,  Mankiw,  and  Zeldes 
1986).' 
The  purpose  of this paper is to study the response  of consumption 
to the  timing  of  labor income  taxes.  We assume  that individuals  are 
infinitely lived so that the taxes do not redistribute across generations. 
We also assume  that labor supply  is inelastic so that the taxes are not 
distortionary.  The  failure  of  Ricardian  equivalence  in our  model  is 
fully  attributable  to  the  insurance  effect  of  the  income  tax  system. 
This  failure  of  Ricardian equivalence,  which was discussed  by Barro 
(1974,  p.  1115) and  Tobin  (1980,  pp.  59-60),  was first analyzed  ex- 
plicitly by Chan using  a two-period  model.  Barsky et al. argued  that 
this insurance  effect  is likely to be quantitatively  important;  they ex- 
amined  multiperiod  examples  but only through  the use of computer 
simulations  and  under  the  assumption  that income  is independently 
distributed  in each period.  Here we allow individual income  to follow 
a Markov process.  Under  the  assumption  that the  utility function  is 
exponential,  we are able to examine  analytically the response  of con- 
sumption  over  time  to various  policy interventions. 
After  describing  the model  and its solution  in Section II, we exam- 
ine in Section  III the impact of changes  in the timing of income taxes. 
All  the  policy  interventions  satisfy  an  intertemporal  government 
budget  constraint.  If contingent  claims markets were complete  or if 
utility  were  quadratic,  one  would  obtain  the  Ricardian  result  that 
these  interventions  have  no  impact  on  consumption.  We  assume, 
however,  that  individuals  face  idiosyncratic  income  risk  and  that, 
since  tax  liabilities  are contingent  on  individual  income,  changes  in 
the  timing  of  these  liabilities change  perceived  risk. This  change  in 
risk interacts with the precautionary  motive for saving (Leland  1968; 
Sandmo  1970;  Dreze  and  Modigliani  1972).  As in Barsky et al., the 
implied  behavior  appears  in some  ways more  Keynesian  than Ricar- 
dian. 
First, we examine  a current  tax cut, coupled  with a tax increase  in 
the future  to repay the additional  debt and accumulated  interest. We 
show  that the  horizon  over  which  the debt is repaid  is crucial to the 
effect  of  the  tax  cut.  Tax  reschedulings  over  short  periods  of  time 
have little impact on consumption,  while tax reschedulings  over long 
periods  of  time have  a substantial impact. 
Second,  we consider  the empirically plausible case in which a tax cut 
is coupled  with  a permanently  higher  level  of  debt.  In  this case,  all 
future  tax rates are raised just  enough  to service the debt. We obtain 
' This  insurance  effect  of  the  taxes  also  affects  many  other  decisions,  such  as the 
accumulation  of  human  capital (Eaton and  Rosen  1980). PRECAUTIONARY  SAVING  865 
partially Ricardian results. A $1.00  tax cut increases consumption,  but 
by less than a $1.00  increment  to wealth does. For reasonable parame- 
ter values, the marginal propensity  to consume  out of such a tax cut is 
about  half the  marginal  propensity  to consume  out of wealth. 
Third,  we examine  the impact of an announced  future tax cut. We 
show  that  this  announcement  causes  an  immediate  increase  in  the 
level of consumption,  followed  by further increases in consumption  as 
the tax cut approaches.  Hence,  while news about future  taxes has an 
immediate  impact  on  consumption,  anticipated  changes  in taxes are 
also associated  with anticipated  changes  in consumption. 
Fourth,  we derive  an index  of  fiscal stance, analogous  to that sug- 
gested  by Blanchard  (1985).  The  index  implies  that fiscal policy has 
similar effects  on aggregate  demand  in precautionary  saving models 
and finite-horizon  models,  even though  the mechanisms  are very dif- 
ferent. 
We  share  with  much  recent  work  the  strategy  of  examining  the 
implications  of capital market imperfections  without deriving  the im- 
perfections  from  the economic  environment  (see, e.g.,  Hubbard  and 
Judd  1986;  Scheinkman  and  Weiss  1986).  A  crucial  assumption  of 
our model  is that individual  human  capital risk cannot be diversified. 
It  would  of  course  be  better  to  derive  this  feature  from  the  more 
primitive  informational  considerations  of  moral hazard and  adverse 
selection.  We hope  that our  model  can provide  a prelude  to a more 
complete  analysis  of  the  interactions  between  precautionary  saving 
and the timing  of  taxes. 
II.  The  Model2 
Consider  an  infinitely  lived  consumer  who  has  additively  time- 
separable von Neumann-Morgenstern  utility f 'e - Psu(ct ,)ds. The con- 
sumer is assumed  to face a constant real interest rate, r, and stochastic 
income  following  a continuous-time  Markov process.3 Let A  =  [Xij] 
be the  Markov transition  matrix among  the J states, with XAi  for i =,4 
representing  the instantaneous  probability of  moving  from  state i to 
states and XA  =  -  X  Xij  representing  the instantaneous  probability of 
leaving  state i.4  The  optimization  problem  for the consumption  and 
2 Some readers may wish to skip to the summary  at the end of this section. 
3 The assumption  of a constant real interest rate is maintained  throughout this pa- 
per. The model can be viewed as "partial  equilibrium";  alternatively,  one can posit a 
small open economy or a linear storage technology. 
4 We shall consistently  use Yjsi as an abbreviation  for )12=  l.  =i. 866  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
saving decision  can then  be written as 
V(wt,  i, t) =  max  e  (P?+ iXij)S u(ct+s) + >3  XAV(w+?sj,  t +  s)lds 
subject to zVt,  =  rwt+S +  yt+s  -  Ct+s, 
Wt  given,  and 
lim  e-rsWt+s  =  0 with probability one, 
where V(wt,  i, t) is expected  utility when starting at time t in state i with 
wealth wt, p is the subjective rate of time preference,  ct,?  is the flow of 
consumption,  and yi+  s is the flow of income in state i at time t + s. The 
continuous-time  Bellman  equation  for this problem  is5 
pV(wt, i, t)  -  Vt(wt,  i, t)  -  E  Xij[V(wtj, t)  -  V(wt, i, t)] 
(2) 
=  max  [u(ct)  +  (rwt +  yt-  ct)Vw(wt,  i,  t)],  i  =  1,  .  J 
Ct 
where  subscripts on  the value  function  indicate  partial derivatives. 
We  examine  the  special  case in which  the  consumer  has constant 
absolute  risk aversion,  that is, 
U(ct) =  e  (3) 
Given  this  assumption,  (2)  can  be  solved  explicitly.6  In  particular, 
there  is a solution  of  the form 
V(w1,  i, t)  = 
-  1  e-y(rw+at)  i  -  1,  ]  (4) 
This  can be demonstrated  as follows.  First, the maximization  on  the 
right-hand  side of  (2) implies  the first-order condition 
u'(cd) =  Vw(wt,  i  ,  i  =  1, ...  J,  (5) 
where  c' is the  optimal  rate of  consumption  if in state i at time t. In 
words, the marginal utility of a dollar's worth of consumption  must be 
set  equal  to  the  marginal  value  of  a dollar  in  the  overall  program. 
Given  the  utility  function  assumed  and  the  value  function  we  are 
5 See Kamien and Schwartz (1981),  pp. 238-42.  They call it "the fundamental  partial 
differential  equation" of  dynamic  programming. 
6  One  could  guess  that this would  be so from  the example  of optimal consumption 
with random  income  in Merton  (1971,  p. 398). PRECAUTIONARY  SAVING  867 
trying out,  (5) implies 
-Yc!  =  -(rwt  i  =  1,  4.*,J  (6) 
which  means  that 
c=rwta,  i  =  1, 
,...,J.  (7) 
Thus a  is the intercept of the "consumption  function" in state i at time 
t, and r is the marginal  propensity  to consume  out of wealth. 
On  substituting  (3),  (4),  and  (7)  into  (2)  and  dividing  by 
(-1/yr)e  -y  (rwt + at), we obtain 
P  +  PYa;?Z  E  Aid  Z  E  Aije(atiaj) 
Ji  Jsi  (8) 
=r  +  yr(a  -yt),  i=  1,...,J. 
In  (8),  the  consumer's  wealth  wt has  dropped  out,  leaving  a set  of 
ordinary  differential  equations  in  the  vector  of  consumption  inter- 
cepts. The  solution  to (8) therefore  indicates a solution to the Bellman 
equation  (2) of  the  proposed  form  (4). 
It can be shown that given a fixed vector y of incomes in each state, 
(8)  has  a  unique  steady-state  vector  of  consumption  intercepts  a.7 
Given a steady-state solution  for the vector of consumption  intercepts 
a, we can readily find the effects on consumption  of marginal changes 
in  the  income  available  in  various  states at various  times.  Denoting 
marginal  departures  from  steady-state  values  by a tilde  (~) and  the 
steady-state  values  themselves  by the omission  of  the time subscript, 
we can "totally differentiate"  (8) to obtain 
ryt =  rd  -  d  + > Xj(d  -  dat)e(aa'),  i  -  1, .  . ,J.  (9) 
isi 
Equation  (9) can be written  in matrix form  as 
rkt =  rat -  at -  Wdt,  (10) 
where y  =  [5]  and at =  [da]  areJ  x  1 vectors and  I  is aJ  X J matrix 
with elements 
-  XA,  k  (a'-a)  forisj  (  1) 
7 With the  notation  defined  below,  since  '  has  row sums  that add  to  zero,  it is a 
continuous-time  Markov matrix and has all nonpositive  eigenvalues.  Thus,  '  -  ri has 
strictly negative  eigenvalues,  which  proves  by the  implicit  function  theorem  that  (8) 
has a unique  steady-state  solution  for the vector a given the vector y since with a set to 
zero,  totally differentiating  the  steady-state  version  of  (8) yields ry  =  (rI  -  W). 868  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
and 
i=  -  >  pi  (12) 
isi 
Equation  (10) is a linear matrix differential  equation  with the stan- 
dard  solution 
WS  x 
at  =  r {  e  re  tAsds  +  he te  -'t  (13) 
where h must be zero for the altered path of consumption  to continue 
to  satisfy  the  budget  constraint  cum  nonsatiation  condition 
lim~ ae  W-rtwt  =  0 with probability one.8 Therefore, 
at  =  r  e-rset  +  sAds.  (14) 
To  find the impact of income  changes  on aggregate  consumption, 
we  must  know  the  distribution  of  consumers  across  income  states. 
Under  the assumption  that there are many consumers  in the economy 
facing  independent  Markov transitions  but with the  same transition 
matrix and that Markov transitions have been  taking place for a long 
time,  the distribution  of consumers  across states will be described  by 
the stationary distribution  Hl* corresponding  to the transition matrix 
A.  Using  Ct, Wt, and  Yt for per capita averages,  (7) and (14) imply 
rx  V 
Ct=  rWt  +  rH* {  e-rse  IYt+sds 
=  x  ~~~~~~~~~~(15) 
-  r Wt +  e-rsYt+sds  +  H|  e-(e'1  -  I)Yt+sds. 
The  term HI*  fo e rs(ews  -  I)ytt+sds  incorporates  all the precautionary 
saving effects  on consumption  resulting  from changes in the distribu- 
tion of  income  across states. The  change  in consumption  due  to the 
income  disturbance  is the interest  rate r times not only the change  in 
financial  wealth  Wt and  the  change  in average  human  wealth  HI  = 
f  e-rsYt+sds,  but  also the  change  in what one  might  call "phantom 
human  wealth,"  Fbt  =  H* fC e-rs(els  -  I)yt+sds,  which  describes  these 
precautionary  saving effects. 
A Special Case 
To  gain a better understanding  of how the precautionary  saving mo- 
tive affects  consumption,  it is helpful  to examine  the  precautionary 
8 If h were  not equal  to zero,  then  as at became  large, the linearization  around  the 
steady  state would  become  inappropriate,  but these  nonlinearities  would  not  prevent 
the violation  of the  budget  constraint. PRECAUTIONARY  SAVING  869 
saving effect  (I, in the special case in which there are only two states- 
a high-income  state (state 1) and a low-income  state (state 2)-and  the 
transition  matrix A is symmetric;  that is, 
A=[-P  P]  (16) 
where p is the instantaneous  probability of a transition from one state 
to the other.  With A as in (16),  I  is given  by 
=  PX  px]  (17) 
where 
x  -ey(a'- a2)  -  U'(c  2) 
u (  C )  (18) 
The  quantity  x  is  the  ratio  of  marginal  utilities  between  the  high- 
income and low-income  states (for a given value of nonhuman  wealth) 
in the initial steady state. Its value can be determined  from the follow- 
ing equation,  which is derived  by subtracting the steady-state version 
of  (8) with i  =  1 from  the steady-state  version  of  (8) with i  =  2 and 
then  using  the definition  (18): 
ln(x)  +  P  - x  =  y(y'  -y).  (19) 
Equation (19) is simple enough  that it can readily be solved for x with 
the help of a pocket calculator. Given x, all other calculations we make 
can be done  explicitly. 
To  find  per capita saving  in the  steady state, we can add  together 
the steady-state  versions  of  (8) for i  =  1, 2, obtaining 
-r  2r  (x  I2)  +y2  a  +  )  (20) 
The  term in parentheses  on the right-hand  side of  (20) is per capita 
saving. Thus 
S  =  rW +  Y-  C =  r  P  +  P  (x+  -2)  (21) 
-yr  2-yr  (21 
It is clear that the  part of  saving due  to the interaction  of individual 
income  uncertainty  with the precautionary  saving motive is (p/2-yr) x 
[x +  (1 Ix) -  2] since  this term  is zero  when  there  is no  income  un- 
certainty  (p  =  0 or x  =  1), while  the  other  term  (r -  p)/-yr  is unaf- 
fected  by income  uncertainty.  We use this expression  below to calcu- 
late the magnitude  of  precautionary  saving. 
We now turn to the analysis of marginal departures  from the steady 870  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
state. To  evaluate  the matrix (ews -  I) in (15) for the special case we 
are  considering,  we  need  to  find  two  eigenvectors,  which  together 
form  a diagonalizing  matrix.  We find that 
t  =+L 
I 
-Px][O  _ 0]P/x  Px]  (22) 
where  the central diagonal  matrix shows the two eigenvalues  of  I  (O 
and  -  8), and 
8  =  x+ 
I 
P.  (23) 
Then 
ets~  ~  I=  aL  P/x]  ? e-8? I L-'1 I1 
=  1  8e-8s[-PX1[1  -1]  (24) 
Finally, since H*  =1/2  1/2]  for a symmetric transition matrix A such as 
in (16), the definition  of (F simplifies  to 
t=  {E  e  rs(  8  )[1)2  1/2]L  P j(5t+s  -yt +S)ds 
x0  (25) 
=  -  1/20  ers(1  -  e)(t+  -  s)ds 
where 
x  x  (lIx)  (26) 
Summary 
Individuals  face  idiosyncratic  risk, but there  is no  aggregate  uncer- 
tainty.  In our  special  case, half  of  all individuals  at time t are in the 
good  state  earning  income  y'  and  half  are in the  bad state earning 
income  y 2. The  probability  of  leaving  a state is p each  period.  Each 
individual  is infinitely  lived  and has a time-separable,  constant  abso- 
lute risk aversion  utility function. 
Given this specification,  aggregate  consumption  locally obeys 
Ct  =  r(Wt  +  fit  +  (t),  (27) 
where  the tilde denotes  the deviation  from the steady-state value.  In 
(27),  V4?  is the  deviation  of  aggregate  nonhuman  wealth,  lt  is the 
deviation  of aggregate  human  wealth defined  as the present  value of PRECAUTIONARY  SAVING  871 
aggregate  labor income, 
Ht  =  e  - rsYt  +.sds,  (28) 
and (Ft is the deviation  of  the precautionary  saving term defined  by 
(=  1/20{  e-rs(1  -  e- s)(5t+s  -  y  +S)ds.  (29) 
The  parameters  0 and 6 are between  zero and one and depend  on the 
dispersion  in income  (y1  -  y2),  the coefficient  of absolute risk aversion 
-y, the interest  rate r, and  the transition  probability p.9 
III.  The  Timing  of Taxes 
We can now analyze the effects  of a tax rescheduling.  Some assump- 
tion  must be made  about  the  type of  tax used.  Any component  of  a 
tax that falls equally on both high-income  and low-income  consumers 
has no  precautionary  saving  effect  because  it does  not affect y +  - 
Yt+s- Hence, Ricardian  equivalence holds for lump-sum taxes. 
We examine  here  the polar opposite  case in which taxes are levied 
only on high-income  individuals.  Since at any time half of the popula- 
tion  is composed  of  high-income  individuals,  a $1.00  per  capita tax 
increase overall requires a $2.00  per capita tax increase on "the rich." 
Therefore,  if T,+s is the overall per capita tax increase in period t +  s 
and  taxes  fall entirely  on  the high-income  individuals,  then 
-1  -  2  =  - 
Yt+s  _  yt+s 
-  -2Tt+s-  (30) 
Substituting  this expression  into  (29), we find that 
(at  =  0  ers(1  -  e-  S)Tt+sds.  (31) 
The  parameters  0 and 6 have an important influence  on the effects  of 
various tax changes,  as will become  clear below. 
Equation (3 1) shows the precautionary  saving effect of tax changes. 
A balanced-budget  tax rescheduling  has no immediate  impact on the 
sum Wt +  Ht of aggregate  human  and financial wealth. Thus  the sole 
initial impact  of  a balanced-budget  tax change  is the  precautionary 
saving effect  r(t. 
9 The  marginal  propensity  to consume  out  of  wealth,  r, is the  same  as that under 
certainty  equivalence  when  r  =  p. The  "excess sensitivity" discussed  by Barsky et al. 
arises with constant  relative risk aversion  but not with constant  absolute risk aversion. 
The  effect  of uncertainty  on the marginal  propensity  to consume  is discussed  in Kim- 
ball (1988).  If uncertainty  raises the  marginal  propensity  to consume,  any departure 
from  Ricardian equivalence  is magnified. 872  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
If the  tax change  is first announced  at time 0, then 
Ct =  r(Wt  +  Ht  +  Dt) 
=  r(-  errC1d d+  +  )  (32) 
=  r(-r {  D  b-TdT  +  (t 
At time 0, when  the tax change  is newly announced,  this simplifies to 
Co  =  r4)o =  rO  ers(l  -  e  s)Tsds.  (33) 
The  immediate  precautionary  saving  effect  on  consumption,  r(t,  is 
the  interesting  effect.  The  other  term  in (32) involving  lagged  con- 
sumption  changes-or,  equivalently,  lagged  precautionary  saving 
changes-is  just  what is necessary  to ensure  that consumers  do  not 
violate  their  budget  constraints:  if they consume  $1.00  more  in one 
year, they must consume  $r less every year from then on to make up 
for  it. The  key insight  is that the  insurance  effects  of  an income  tax 
can induce  consumers  to consume  more  now without any immediate 
change  in their aggregate  resources  Wt +  Ht. 
Policy Experiment  1: A Tax Cut with a Future Tax 
Increase 
There  are several  interesting  special  cases. The  simplest  is a tax cut 
repaid  k years later.  If such a tax cut occurs in period  0, then 
so  =  0(1  -  e- k)D,  (34) 
where D is the size of the initial tax cut and the initial addition  to the 
national debt as a result of that tax cut. Equation (34) indicates that an 
income  tax cut followed  by a compensating  income  tax increase  the 
next year has very little effect  on consumption,  but a tax cut followed 
by a tax increase  many years later has a much larger effect.  In other 
words, the interval between  tax cut and tax increase (k) is crucial to the 
impact  of  the  tax cut.  Individuals  face  little uncertainty  about  their 
income  next  year, and there is correspondingly  little insurance  effect 
of  higher  income  taxes  next  year.  But  individuals  face  much  more 
uncertainty  about  their  income  10 or  20  years from  now,  and,  as a 
result,  higher  income  taxes  10 or 20 years in the  future  have a sub- 
stantial insurance  effect. 
The  theory  presented  here  is one  way to rationalize  the  intuitive 
notion  that tax rescheduling  within a year or any other  short period 
of  time  should  not  have  much  effect  but  that tax rescheduling  over PRECAUTIONARY SAVING  873 
longer  periods  of  time  should  have  substantial  effects  on  consump- 
tion.  A  common  debating  point  for  Ricardians  has been  that if  tax 
rescheduling  within  a year  does  not  matter,  then  tax  rescheduling 
over the course of' 20 years also should  not matter. We have identified 
here  a clear distinction  between  tax rescheduling  over short  periods 
of  time  and  tax  rescheduling  over  long  periods  of  time,  even  for 
infinitely  lived  consumers. 
Some Illustrative Calculations 
To  judge  the  magnitude  of'  the  precautionary  saving  effects,  it 
is necessary  to calibrate  the  model.  There  are  two  key  parameters: 
_y(y'  -  y2)  and p/r. From these  two magnitudes,  the other  parameters 
of interest,  such  as 0 and  8/r, can be computed."'( 
The  first parameter,  y(y  -  y2), incorporates  both the degree  of' risk 
aversion  y and the cross-sectional  dispersion  in income  (y'  -  y2). Note 
that  y(y'  -  y2) can be written  as  Iy2[(y'/y2)  -  1] and  that yy2 is the 
coefficient  of relative risk aversion  evaluated  at the level of income  in 
the bad state. If' we make the conservative  assumption  that income  in 
the  good  state  is  twice  income  in  the  bad  state,  so  that  the  cross- 
sectional  coefficient  of' variation in income  is only  1',  then  Py(yl  -  y2) 
can be interpreted  simply  as the  coefficient  of' relative risk aversion. 
We therefore  allow this parameter  to range over the region  from 0.5 
to  10. 
The  second  parameter  is p/r. Note  that the transition  probability p 
has the same units as the interest  rate r; hence,  p/r is a pure number. 
We allow pir to vary from 0.10 to 5.0. If' r is 2 percent per year, then p 
is varying from 0.2 percent  per year to 10 percent  per year. To judge 
the magnitude  of p, note  that over a 25-year  horizon,  the probability 
that an individual  leaves the state in which he begins is 12 percent if p 
is 0.5  percent  and  is 63  percent  if p is 4.0  percent. 
Tables  1, 2,  and  3  present  the  values  of' 0,  8/r,  and  x  for  these 
parameter  values.  If' we  assume  for  the  moment  that  the  debt  and 
accumulated  interest  associated  with a tax cut are pushed  far enough 
into the future  that e-  ak  can be ignored,  equation  (34) shows that the 
marginal  propensity  to consume  out  of' a tax cut is 0 times the  mar- 
ginal  propensity  to  consume  out  of' wealth.  Table  1 shows  that the 
value of' 0 is usually  in excess  of' 11'2  and  is often  close  to one.  These 
numbers,  together  with  equation  (34),  imply  that the  precautionary 
saving effect  can be quite  potent. 
The  numbers  for 8/r in table 2 can be used to see how quickly e-ak 
lo The  interest  rate r can be viewed  as fixing  the time  uLnit; all other  rates are given 
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TABLE  1 
VALUE  OF  0  FOR  VARIOUS  PARAMETER  VALUES 
pir 
y(y'  -  y2)  .10  .5  1.0  2.0  5.0 
.5  .39  .24  .16  .10  .05 
1.0  .67  .45  .32  .20  .09 
2.0  .91  .73  .56  .37  .18 
5.0  1.00  .95  .88  .72  .41 
10.0  1.00  .99  .97  .90  .68 
declines with k. For an interest rate r of 2 percent per year, a value for 
8 of 4 percent  per year is likely. For k =  25, e-8k  is 0.37.  Hence,  for a 
tax liability pushed  25 years into the future,  the marginal propensity 
to consume  out of the tax cut is 0.630 times the marginal propensity to 
consume  out of  wealth. 
Table  3 presents x, the ratio of marginal utility in the bad state and 
good  state given  equal nonhuman  wealth in both states. These  num- 
bers suggest  that marginal  utility in the bad state is about two to five 
times marginal utility in the good  state. This ratio is, of course, larger 
if the cross-sectional  dispersion  in income  is larger, if individuals  are 
more  risk averse, or if the transition  probability is smaller relative to 
the interest  rate. 
The  amount  of  precautionary  saving  expressed  as  a  fraction  of 
average  labor income, 
2y(y'  _  y2)r  y  +  x  - 
is given in table 4. It is clear that the amount  of precautionary  saving 
can be substantial. It should  be remembered,  though,  that in general 
TABLE  2 
VALUE  OF 8/r  FOR  VARIOUS  PARAMETER  VALUES 
pir 
y(yl 
- 
y2)  .10  .5  1.0  2.0  5.0 
.5  .22  1.03  2.03  4.02  10.01 
1.0  .27  1.12  2.11  4.08  10.05 
2.0  .49  1.47  2.42  4.31  10.17 
5.0  2.01  3.29  4.15  5.73  10.98 
10.0  5.92  7.38  8.16  9.40  13.57 PRECAUTIONARY SAVING  875 
TABLE  3 
VALUE  OF X FOR  VARIOUS  PARAMETER  VALUES 
pir 
y(y'  -  y2)  .10  .5  1.0  2.0  5.0 
.5  1.51  1.28  1.18  1.11  1.05 
1.0  2.27  1.63  1.39  1.22  1.10 
2.0  4.71  2.54  1.89  1.48  1.20 
5.0  20.06  6.43  3.90  2.46  1.55 
10.0  59.21  14.69  8.04  4.47  2.28 
equilibrium  the precautionary  saving motive might show up as much 
in a lower  interest  rate r as in increased  saving. 
Policy Experiment  2: A Tax Cut with Permanently 
Higher Debt 
Another  interesting  experiment  is a permanent  increase  in govern- 
ment  debt,  with  the  interest  on  the  extra  debt  financed  by  higher 
taxes.  For this experiment,  (31) implies  that 
40  =  4)=  .  (35) 
In words,  consumers  act as if a permanent  addition  to government 
debt is at least partially net wealth, where the fraction that is treated as 
TABLE  4 
PRECAUTIONARY  SAVING  AS  A  PERCENTAGE  OF  AVERAGE  LABOR  INCOME 
_X  +  4--  2)1  * 100% 
pir 
y(y1  _  y2)  .10  .5  1.0  2.0  5.0 
.5  1.1  2.1  1.8  1.3  .7 
1.0  2.3  4.1  3.8  2.6  1.4 
2.0  4.9  7.7  7.0  5.2  2.7 
5.0  12.0  15.3  14.3  11.5  6.6 
10.0  19.1  21.2  20.5  18.0  11.9 
NOTE.-The  figures  in this  table  are based  on the assumption  thaty' = 2y2  or, equivalently,  that  (Y2 -/y  =  2/3 
1  1 In (2 1), a reduction  in r may not at first reduce saving since a lower interest rate can 
increase the precautionary  component  of saving (see table 4), but if r falls low enough, 
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TABLE  5 
VALUE  OF [8/(r  +  8)]6 FOR  VARIOUS  PARAMETER  VALUES 
p/r 
Y(yI  -  y2)  .10  .5  1.0  2.0  5.0 
.5  .07  .12  .11  .08  .04 
1.0  .14  .24  .22  .16  .09 
2.0  .30  .43  .40  .30  .16 
5.0  .66  .73  .7  1  .61  .38 
10.0  .86  .87  .86  .82  .63 
net wealth  is [8/(r  +  8)]O. Table  5 shows this fraction  for alternative 
values  of  the  parameters.  It  is  clear  from  table  5  that  substantial 
departures  from  Ricardian  equivalence  are  likely.  Yet  government 
debt is still far from being  treated as 100 percent net wealth. Whether 
this  model  gives  results  closer  to  full  Ricardian  neutrality  or  naive 
neglect  of  future  tax  liabilities  depends  on  the  parameters,  but the 
best guess  is probably halfway in between.'2 
The  numbers  in table 5 are similar in magnitude  to figures derived 
from a life cycle model of consumption.  Poterba and Summers (1987) 
simulate  a realistic model  of life cycle saving: they compute  the frac- 
tion  of  government  debt  that  is net  wealth  assuming  that taxes  are 
levied to service the debt. Their table 1 reports that, depending  on the 
parameters,  this fraction  varies from  .53  to .85.  Hence,  the  precau- 
tionary saving effect highlighted  here can potentially provide as great a 
deviation from the Ricardian benchmark as the finiteness of life does. 
Policy Experiment  3: An Anticipated  Future Tax Cut 
A final experiment  of interest is a tax rescheduling  announced  several 
periods  in advance.  Let k be  the  time  at which  the  tax change  is to 
begin,  but let that change  be announced  at the beginning  of period 0. 
Equation  (31) implies  that, for 0 -  t  k, 
(Pt  =  0 {  er(s  t)[1  -  e-8(s-t)]7Tsds  =  0  e- r(s  - t)  [_e(S-t)]  Tds 
=  e(r+?)(t-k)  0  e-r(s-k)[1  -  e  8(s  k)]  Tsds  (36) 
=  (r  +8 )(t -k) q) 
12 It should  be remembered  that these numbers are based on the assumption  that all 
taxes  fall on  the  high-labor-income  half  of  the  population.  Less progressive  taxation 
would  lead to smaller effects,  as discussed  below. PRECAUTIONARY  SAVING  877 
where  the key simplification  in the first line results from the fact that 
the tax change  is a balanced-budget  tax change.  Then  using  (32), we 
can find the overall  effect  on consumption: 
C-=  re  H  +)*[  4  +  r  8  e(r?k)t1)  (37) 
for 0 -  t -  k. 
Equation  (37) shows that the effect  of the tax cut on consumption 
grows through  time as the tax cut approaches.  This  magnification  of 
the  insurance  effects  of  an announced  tax change  as it draws closer 
causes  a change  in consumption  predictable  in advance,  contrary to 
the  proposition  that  changes  in  consumption  should  be  unpredict- 
able.  This  departure  from  Hall's  (1978)  random  walk  property  of 
consumption  is not surprising  theoretically  since the utility functions 
assumed  here are exponential  rather than quadratic. But in tax policy 
we have identified  a factor that can affect expected  variances of indi- 
vidual  income  and  therefore  expected  changes  in consumption  in a 
systematic way. 
An Index of Fiscal Stance 
Blanchard  (1985)  has recently  suggested  an index  of  fiscal stance to 
summarize  the  impact  of  fiscal  policy  on  aggregate  demand.  His 
model  is non-Ricardian  because  agents  have finite horizons:  they die 
at rate q and  are replaced  with newly  born  individuals.  Blanchard's 
index  of  fiscal stance is 
gt  =  (q  +  P)Dt -  {  e(r  +q)sTt+sds]  +  Gt,  (38) 
where D, is the debt, Gt is government  purchases,  and Tt is taxes. This 
index  includes  the  direct  effect  of  government  purchases  and  the 
indirect  effects  of  government  debt and taxes on consumption. 
The  model  of  precautionary  saving  presented  here  suggests  an 
analogous  index  of  fiscal stance.  Equations  (27),  (28),  and  (31) indi- 
cate that the appropriate  index  is 
gt*  =  r Dt -  (1  0)  e-rsTt+sds  -  0 
f 
ei(r+8)sTt+sds  +  Gt.  (39) 
This index  includes  the effect  of debt through  nonhuman  wealth Wt, 
the effect  of taxes through  human  wealth Ht, and the effect  of taxes 
through  the precautionary  saving term  lt. 
In the limiting  case in which 0  =  1, the two indices of fiscal stance 
are almost identical.  The  marginal propensity  to consume  is q +  p in 
Blanchard's index,  while it is r in ours. More important,  the discount 878  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
rate for future  taxes is r +  q in Blanchard's index,  while it is r +  6 in 
ours.  In both  cases,  the  discounting  of  tax liabilities at a rate higher 
than r is the reason  for the  failure  of  Ricardian equivalence.'3 
Remember  that the index  in (39) is derived  under  the assumption 
that taxes  fall only  on  the  high-income  individuals.  More  generally, 
suppose  that a fraction  of taxes falls on the poor and (1 -  f)  falls on 
the rich. Such a tax can be decomposed  as 2f lump-sum  and (1 -  2f) 
falling  only on the  rich. Therefore,  the more  general  index  is 
t=  r[Dt -  (1 -  0')  e-rsTt+sds  -  0' 
{  e-(r+)T tsds1  +  Gt, 
(40) 
where  0'  =  0(1  -  2f).  A fraction  0' of future  taxes is discounted  at 
rate r +  8, while the remainder  is discounted  at rate r. The index thus 
readily  handles  any degree  of  progressivity. 
IV.  Conclusion 
This paper has analyzed rigorously the role of the timing of taxes in a 
world in which taxes are contingent  on individual income and individ- 
ual income  is subject to nondiversifiable  idiosyncratic risk. Casual em- 
piricism,  as  well  as  the  more  formal  empirical  work  discussed  by 
Barsky et al., suggests  that the sort of heterogeneity  examined  here is 
substantial. Such heterogeneity  among  individuals  has potentially im- 
portant  aggregate  effects.  Under  reasonable  auxiliary  assumptions, 
these  aggregate  effects  can be explicitly  derived. 
Previously authors analyzing the interaction between taxes and pre- 
cautionary  saving have typically relied  on  two-period  examples.  Our 
goal  has  been  to  extend  the  analysis  to  a more  general  and  more 
realistic setting.  The  infinite-horizon  model  presented  here  is much 
richer in its implications,  is more  easily compared  with standard  dy- 
namic  models,  and  should  prove  a more  useful  guide  for  empirical 
work. 
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